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1. Executive Summary  
Hunting accidents can have devastating consequences. One of the most common causes of hunting 
fatalities in this country, and others, are target identification failures—mistaking people for game.  
A golden rule in firearm safety is to identify your target beyond all doubt. Despite this message being 
constantly repeated, accidents are still occurring. Hunter education and awareness about high 
visibility clothing have reduced accident rates, but these statistics have since plateaued. Contrary to 
what most people think, the hunters committing these accidents are often experienced and 
considered to be safe and competent. Crucially, they often believe they have, 100%, correctly 
identified their target.  
Psychology and human factors can provide insight into how these situations might occur. When 
interpreting information, we rely heavily upon mental rules of thumb called heuristics. Heuristics 
operate outside of our conscious awareness and are utilised even more in stressful or emotionally-
charged situations. However, they can also make us susceptible to cognitive biases which may lead 
us astray—we underestimate the impact heuristics will have on our decisions. Attempts to manage 
heuristics and cognitive biases are often futile because we normally cannot detect them when they 
occur. Hunters are constantly told that they need to treat every sound or movement as human in an 
attempt to change their mind-set. However, given the difficulty in detecting cognitive biases, it is 
unlikely a huŶteƌ͛s ĐoŶsĐious ŵaŶageŵeŶt of heuƌistiĐs ǁould ďe ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ possible in the long 
term. 
Cognitive biases undoubtedly occur in hunting as in most activities we do. Analyses of accidents and 
anecdotal reports point to their involvement, as does research showing their involvement in other 
critical environments, including firearms operations in the military and the police. Given the 
impracticality of preventing heuristics and cognitive biases from affecting a hunter͛s target 
identification, an additional approach is required.  One method to prevent mistaken-for-game 
hunting accidents may involve the use of objective warning systems, such as those used to prevent 
friendly fire in the military. 
This white paper discusses four key cognitive biases which we believe play a role in mistaken-for-
game hunting accidents: the availability heuristic, expectancy, confirmation bias, and optimism bias. 
We also present the assertion that experience may not safeguard a hunter, and may in fact do the 
opposite. Other contributing factors—buck fever, poor choice of clothing, and snap shooting—are 
discussed in relation to cognitive biases. However, there is currently a notable lack of research on 
the role of cognitive biases in hunting accidents per se. As a result, more work needs to be 
conducted to verify the conclusions of this white paper, for which a human factors approach must 
be taken. 
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3. Introduction 
This paper uses a human factors perspective to understand why responsible, experienced hunters 
may sometimes make seemingly inexplicable mistakes in target identification. 
A man makes his way through the bush, sometime after splitting up with his hunting 
companion. A movement nearby captures his attention. He stops and sees what 
appears to be a deer, less than 40 metres away. This is what he has been waiting 
for. He carefully moves to a better position and again eyes his target. He can make 
out the head and the antlers of the deer and watches as it feeds; its head bobs up 
and down. It is definitely, 100% a deer and he prepares to shoot. 
This is not an uncommon chain of events in the lead up to a hunting accident. It can describe a 
classic case of mistaken target identity, which sources suggest is the most common type of fatal 
hunting accident in New Zealand1 and elsewhere too.2  
On average, a hunter is accidentally killed every nine months in New Zealand. To date in 2015, there 
have been two accidents where target misidentification was a factor, one of which was fatal. The 
majority of fatalities involving misidentified targets occur in big game as opposed to small game 
hunting.3 In New Zealand the accidents primarily involve deer hunting. A 2003 report1 by Inspector 
Joe Green of the New Zealand Police analysed 33 fatal deer hunting accidents occurring between 
1979 and 2002. Incorrect target identification was by far the largest contributor (64%) in the cases 
examined, and figures from overseas appear to be similar, if not higher.4   
On the face of it, it seems unlikely to hunters and non-hunters alike that a person could be mistaken 
for a deer. Furthermore, it seems incomprehensible that a hunter could truly believe he had correctly 
identified his target, as a deer, when in fact what he was seeing was a person—most often his own 
hunting companion.  
One of the golden rules in firearm/hunter safety is ͞IdeŶtifǇ Ǉouƌ taƌget ďeǇoŶd all douďt.͟ “uƌelǇ, 
for someone to wind up accidentally shooting their own hunting companion after mistaking them for 
a deer, they have violated this rule. Commonly it is thought that the hunter must have been 
inexperienced, reckless, or has ͞shot at sound͟ as opposed to properly identifying the target.  
However, both the statistics and many anecdotal reports paint a different picture. Often the person 
committing this act is an experienced hunter. He is considered safe and competent. Crucially, it 
                                                             
1 See Green, J. (2003). To Hunt and Return: Developing Safe Hunting Practice. Wellington, New Zealand: New 
Zealand Police. 
2 See http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00044112.htm, Table 1 
3 E.g. Junuzovic, M., & Eriksson, A. (2012). Unintentional firearm hunting deaths in Sweden. Forensic science 
international, 216, 12–18. 
4 See www.ihea.com 
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appears that they have identified their target beyond all doubt.  To the shooter, there is no doubt, 
whatsoever, that their target is a deer.  
The broader history of accidents over the last fifty years—through the influence of hunter training 
and then the inclusion of high visibility wear (hunter orange)—shows a steady rate of improvement 
in accident statistics. However in the past decade the statistics have plateaued, reflecting the 
limitations of education and high visibility clothing. 
4. Insight from psychology 
As to how this plateauing of improvement can be explained, the field of psychology can give us 
insight. A common misunderstanding5 aďout hoǁ ǁe, as huŵaŶs, ͞see͟ thiŶgs is that ǁhateǀeƌ light 
Đoŵes iŶto ouƌ eǇes is ͞seeŶ͟ oƌ peƌĐeiǀed ďǇ us. This is not true. Our eyes take in visual information 
but then our brain, acting like a filter, determines what we actually perceive and what we become 
͞aǁaƌe͟ of.6 The role of the brain in this, should not be underestimated. If we were aware of every 
bit of visual information that our eyes took in, our brains would be completely and utterly 
overloaded. 
Research has shown that humans are often unable to detect large and seemingly obvious visual 
changes in the environment.7 A well-known demonstration of this used by psychologists is a video 
where a gorilla walks onto a basketball court during a game in full view of the camera.8  Observers 
are asked to focus on the basketball activity in the foreground and as a consequence they often fail 
to report seeing the gorilla. This scene is often used by psychologists to show how easy it is to miss 
obvious details when our attention is focused elsewhere. Furthermore, we tend to overestimate our 
ability to perceive such visual changes; ǁe thiŶk theƌe is ͞Ŷo ǁaǇ͟ ǁe Đould miss such an obvious 
event in front of our very eyes.9 
AŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole of ouƌ ďƌaiŶs is to ͞fill iŶ͟ ďits of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd ŵake assuŵptioŶs aďout ǁhat 
we are seeing. If we had to walk around our vehicle twice in the mall car park, carefully looking it up 
and down before deciding that it was indeed our vehicle, we would waste a lot of time. Luckily, upon 
returning to the car we have only to briefly glance at it from a distance to ĐoŶfiƌŵ it͛s ouƌs. We 
remember the general area that we parked in and we quickly recognise the characteristic shape of 
the vehicle.  However, most people will have, at one point or another, experienced trying to get into 
                                                             
5 See Findlay, J.M., Gilchrist, I.D. (2003). Active Vision: The Psychology of Looking and Seeing. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
6 This is the most commonly accepted theory. For a wider discussion see 
http://www.simplypsychology.org/perception-theories.html  
7 For a review on this see Simons, D. J. (2000). Attentional capture and inattentional blindness. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 4, 147–155. 
8 See http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/videos.html  
9 See Levin, D. (2002). Change blindness: As visual metacognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 111–130.  
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the wrong car. We wonder how we could have been so stupid. IŶ ƌealitǇ, the saŵe ͚logiĐ͛ that leads 
us back to our car in the carpark ninety-nine percent of the time, can fail us now and again. 
The mistake of trying to get into the wrong car might be embarrassing, but it is insignificant—there is 
no harm done. We would certainly not trade this one-off situation for the cumulative time that we 
would have spent, methodically double-checking that we had correctly selected our car each time 
we walked back to it over the years.  
The above is an example of how we use ƌules of thuŵď Đalled ͞heuƌistiĐs͟ to make sense of the 
world around us. They are evolved strategies which we rely upon heavily.10 They make our behaviour 
smooth, fast, and efficient, and are therefore extremely useful to us. 
5. Heuristics 
Heuristics enable us to make correct decisions without actually having all of the information we 
technically need to make a decision. They allow unconscious mental processes to make up for the 
missing information and lead us to a decision that is, most of the time, correct. Our brain achieves 
this by making use of our prior experiences, memories, knowledge, and expectations. All of this 
occurs outside of our conscious awareness and so we are often oblivious to the impact of heuristics 
on our interpretations.9 It is important to add that these are also processes that can work against us 
and contribute to poor decision making.11 
The more familiar we become with certain tasks or environments, the more likely we are to use 
heuristics to make decisions in an efficient and automatic way.12 We become better at recognising 
our environment and making predictions about it. ͞Experts͟ are often people who use heuristics in 
order to make effective decisions quickly or when there is little information to go on. Think about a 
sport or a specific task you are proficient at. When you first began, you were likely much slower and 
decisions were more deliberate and effortful. Compare this to now, where you are more efficient 
and, at times, opeƌatiŶg iŶ ͞autopilot͟ ŵode. DƌiǀiŶg is a good eǆaŵple of this. Chess is another—
people are often surprised to learn of the reliance on heuristics, rather than analytical thinking, by 
expert chess players.13 Grandmaster chess players use ͞iŶtuitioŶ͟ aŶd ͞patteƌŶ ƌeĐogŶitioŶ͟ far more 
often than amateur players. Instead of consciously analysing gameplay and carefully comparing the 
effects of different moves, experts quickly and automatically recognise patterns (e.g. the 
arrangement of the pieces) by drawing on memories from their extensive hours of past experience. 
                                                             
10 See Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. 
11 See Thuraisingham, M. M. (2013). The Secret Life of Decisions: How Unconscious Bias Subverts Your Judgement. 
Gower Publishing, Ltd.. 
12 See James, W. (2004). The Principles of Psychology (Volume 1 of 2). Digireads.com Publishing. 
13 See DeCroot, A. D. (1965). Thought and choice in chess. 
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Indeed, MRI brain scans show that expert chess players use different areas of their brains to what 
non-expert players use.14 
Drivers also rely heavily on heuristics. As an experienced driver, you can sometimes tell when a 
driver in the lane next to you is about to change lanes, before they even indicate. To recognise this, 
Ǉou aƌe piĐkiŶg up oŶ ͞Đues,͟ ǁhiĐh aƌe pieĐes of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that iŶdiĐate the state of the other car 
beside you. You might find that the slight drift of their car within their lane serves as a visual cue, 
while the noise of their engine serves as an auditory cue. Together, these cues allow you to predict 
the dƌiǀeƌ͛s Ŷeǆt ŵoǀe, afteƌ haǀiŶg seeŶ otheƌ dƌiǀeƌs do the saŵe thiŶg ďefoƌe. Just like expert 
chess players, you are using pattern recognition and intuition. One of these cues alone may not have 
led to your prediction, but the two combined have a cumulative effect.15 OfteŶ Ǉou ǁoŶ͛t ďe aďle to 
tell exactly what cues you used to predict another driver͛s behaviour—Ǉou just ͞had a feeliŶg.͟  
We utilise heuristics even more in stressful or emotionally-charged situations.16 Often it is these 
situations where decisions are the most time-pressured. Our prehistoric ancestors did not stand 
there stroking their beards in thought after seeing a flash of a predator in long grass nearby. And for 
aŶǇ that ŵight haǀe doŶe, it is uŶlikelǇ that theiƌ geŶes aƌe pƌeseŶt iŶ todaǇ͛s populatioŶ.  
6. The pitfalls of heuristics: Cognitive biases 
 A downside of heuristics is that theǇ ŵake us susĐeptiďle to ͞ĐogŶitiǀe ďiases.͟ For the majority, an 
unconscious phenomenon, cognitive biases can send us down the path of making an incorrect 
decision (e.g. the mall carpark example above). The resulting mistakes are usually only trivial in 
nature, and all things considered, we would not want to forgo our ability to use heuristics only to be 
stuck with the slow and inefficient alternative of careful reasoning (which of course, does have its 
place). However there are situations where the consequences of being led astray by a cognitive bias 
are severe. Furthermore, a Ŷuŵďeƌ of faĐtoƌs ŵake aŶǇ atteŵpt at ͞ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟ of ĐogŶitiǀe 
biases challenging or even implausible. Firstly, they can be impossible to detect at the point of 
occurrence given that they operate outside of our conscious awareness. Secondly, being armed with 
the knowledge that we suffer from irrational biases does not prevent them from occurring. 
Unfortunately we cannot expect to be able to just take a step back and rein them in. This is why the 
well-intentioned hunting adǀiĐe of ͞tƌeat eǀeƌǇ souŶd oƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt as huŵaŶ uŶtil pƌoǀeŶ 
otheƌǁise͟ ǁill Ŷot ďe as effeĐtiǀe as one might expect. Finally, it is human nature to underestimate 
the impact they have on us. We overestimate the control we have over our judgements and 
                                                             
14 See Wan, X., Nakatani, H., Ueno, K., Asamizuya, T., Cheng, K., & Tanaka, K. (2011). The neural basis of intuitive 
best next-move generation in board game experts. Science, 331, 341–346. 
15 See McCammon, I. (2004). Heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents: Evidence and implications. 
Avalanche News, 68, 42–50. 
16 See Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior. 
Psychological review, 66, 183. 
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decisions, and underestimate the role that unconscious processes have. In essence our biggest 
failure is not admitting that we are fallible. 
Another challenge we face in managing cognitive biases may come in the aftermath of an accident, 
when we attempt to determine the cause of a critical error. In medicine for example, when one 
ƌadiologist is sĐƌutiŶisiŶg aŶotheƌ ƌadiologist͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe afteƌ it has eŵeƌged that theǇ failed to 
detect a tumour in a chest scan, the likelihood that the radiologist in question should have been able 
to see the tumour tends to be overestimated. This has ďeeŶ Đalled a ͞ǀisual hiŶdsight ďias͟ oƌ ͞saǁ-
it-all-aloŶg͟ effeĐt.17 CloselǇ ƌelated to this is ͞fuŶdaŵeŶtal attƌiďutioŶ eƌƌoƌ͟ ǁhiĐh describes how 
we often place the blame solely on supposed factors within the person (such as recklessness or 
carelessness) rather than considering the circumstance as a whole and whether in the same 
circumstances, a person of similar training and experience might have done the same thing.18 So 
whilst it may be easy for many to pass a quick judgment on a hunter who has fired in error, the 
reality is that those judging are often completely unable to understand the unconscious processes 
that have led to the hunter making the mistake in target identification. 
7. Heuristics and cognitive biases in hunting  
The fact that heuristics and cognitive biases occur in hunting is without question. A hunter who was 
unable to use heuristics would not be a very successful hunter. Hunters sometimes speak of other 
suĐĐessful huŶteƌs as ďeiŶg ďetteƌ at ͞seeiŶg deeƌ.͟ TheǇ pƌoďaďlǇ ǁoŶ͛t Ƌuite ďe aďle to put theiƌ 
finger on what is responsible for this though. They may put it down to knowing where to look and 
then to being better able to pick a deer out from its surroundings. Heuristics and cognitive biases are 
responsible for this. 
For an experienced hunter who has shot many deer, the cues that signal the presence of an animal 
are all too familiar—they become ingrained into their psyche. For a start, they know what to look 
for. Subtle signs of browsing, a smell of deer on the breeze that a novice may not have picked up on, 
let them know that a deer has been in the area. A barely audible crack of a twig rouses them—they 
nod to their ŶoǀiĐe huŶtiŶg paƌtŶeƌ, ǁho didŶ͛t hear it. The difference is that the experienced hunter 
was already half-expecting to hear a deer browsing; they were ͞pƌiŵed͟ to heaƌ it. CoŵďiŶed ǁith 
the size of the pƌiŶts theǇ͛d just seeŶ iŶ the ŵud, the experienced hunter was able to use their past 
experiences to deduce that it had to be a stag. 
A fellow hunter might tell you about a time they were ǁatĐhiŶg a ͞deeƌ,͟ ǁaitiŶg foƌ it to staŶd up. 
After a period of time though, and upon getting closer, the ͞deeƌ͟ turned out to be a log, a stump, or 
perhaps a nikau palm frond. It is not uncommon to see deer features in inanimate objects, and even 
to then collectively transform these objects into an actual deer. It is only after the hunter realises 
                                                             
17 See Harley, E. M., Carlsen, K. A., & Loftus, G. R. (2004). The" saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual 
hindsight bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 960. 
18 See Green, M. (2006). Human error vs. design error. Trial, 42, 60. 
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that they were actually looking at an inanimate object that they wonder how they could have been 
mistaken—now it seems so obvious that it is just a log. Moments earlier though, it was a different 
story. 
Some might suggest that hunters should just elect to use conscious reasoning instead of heuristics 
during target identification. The biggest problem with this is that it is not really possible—heuristics 
operate outside of our awareness, so even when we think we are using deliberate reasoning, we 
may not be.19 Even if we could there would be another problem (although you would expect people 
would happily embrace this, if it guaranteed them of never mistaking another hunter for game); by 
the time we had made a decision using conscious reasoning, the deer we were looking at would 
probably have moved on and be out of shooting position. 
Cognitive biases occur in hunting, just as they do in every other facet of our lives.  The question is, 
how significant is their contribution, in this country and others, to the recurrent cause of hunting 
fatalities, namely mistaken target identification? 
In 2012 Henry Worsp shot his hunting companion and good friend. He was experienced, well aware 
of safe hunting practice, and considered himself to be a safety-conscious hunter—his peers held this 
view about him also. 
 
Figure 1 - Line of sight reconstructed by New Zealand Police  
                                                             
19 See Green, M. (2006). Human error vs. design error. Trial, 42, 60. 
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Woƌsp͛s aĐĐouŶt details a ĐhaiŶ of eǀeŶts aŶd pƌe-existing factors that likely contributed to the 
devastating end result. The tǁo huŶteƌs hadŶ͛t iŶteŶded to split up, ďut had lost sight of eaĐh otheƌ 
about 30 minutes beforehand. Worsp knew it was possible for someone to mistake a human for a 
deeƌ, ďut thought it ǁas uŶlikelǇ to happeŶ to hiŵ. He said that he had a ͞loǁ peƌĐeived risk of this 
happening.͟20 
Worsp saw what he thought was a deer on a game trail, with its head bobbing up and down as it fed. 
At that point he was certain it was a deer, however he moved position to get a better view, checking 
and re-checking. The image aďoǀe shoǁs us Woƌsp͛s appƌoǆiŵate liŶe of sight, as ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐted ďǇ 
New Zealand Police. When he pulled the trigger he was 100% certain he was looking at a deer. 
There are several pieces of information that Worsp recalled which point to the involvement of 
cognitive biases. Investigators suggested that the antlers of a fallow deer which Worsp perceived 
were likely to be fern fronds (see Figure 1). This suggests that fƌoŵ Woƌsp͛s ǀaŶtage poiŶt, the 
ǀiĐtiŵ͛s head ǁas beside or below the fern fronds. Couple this with Woƌsp͛s comment that it looked 
as if the ͞deeƌ͟ ǁas feediŶg, moving its head up and down. Perhaps movement by the victim had 
caused the ferns to move at the same time, further contributing to a visual effect which could have 
been mistaken for a deer head and antlers moving up and down. Investigators also suggested that 
the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s Đaŵouflaged backpack was mistaken for the back of a deer, while the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s haiƌ may 
have appeared similar in colour to the coat of a deer. 
The president of the New Zealand Deeƌstalkeƌs AssoĐiatioŶ, Bill O͛LeaƌǇ, talks of hoǁ people might 
do this, saǇiŶg ͞they see little pieces of what they think is a deer and they convince themselves what 
they see is a deer."21 The MouŶtaiŶ “afetǇ CouŶĐil saǇs that ͞HuŶteƌs should sight the head, neck, 
and shoulder of the animal all at the same time, or at least sufficient of the animal to confirm target 
ideŶtifiĐatioŶ.͟22  
The concerning part about this is that it appears these shooters believe they have identified these 
parts of the animal. In the case of Worsp, pieces of the environment surrounding the victim were 
perceived as being part of the head of the deer. CoŵďiŶed ǁith the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ďaĐkpaĐk aŶd ƌed haiƌ, 
Worsp had three pieces of information that could have been interpreted as confirming evidence of 
the pƌeseŶĐe of a deeƌ ;see ͞ĐoŶfiƌŵatioŶ ďias͟ ďeloǁͿ.  
                                                             
20 See http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/8433027/Hunter-who-killed-friend-was-certain-he-was-a-deer 
21 See http://www.stuff.co.nz/southland-times/news/67500123/Deerstalkers-boss-urges-hunters-to-change-
mindset  
22 See Mountain Safety Council Media Release, 22 March, 2012: 
http://www.mountainsafety.org.nz/files/20120322---Firearms---Mountain-Safety-Council-warns-hunters-to-
be-safe-this-deer-hunting-season.pdf  
 Mistaken-for-Game Hunting Accidents – A Human Factors Review  
September 2015 
HFEx Ltd   
 13 
 
Pƌeǀious ƌeseaƌĐh ;suĐh as GƌeeŶ͛sͿ ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith Ŷuŵeƌous ŵedia ƌepoƌts aƌe aďle to giǀe us a 
piĐtuƌe of the tǇpiĐal situatioŶ iŶǀolǀiŶg a fatal huŶtiŶg aĐĐideŶt. The ͞tǇpiĐal͟ situation is very much 
like a ͞tǇpiĐal͟ huŶt. Usually both the hunter and the deceased are males and they are experienced 
huŶteƌs. GƌeeŶ͛s 2003 report found that hunters involved in accidents are generally not members of 
hunting associations, however several recent accidents have involved prominent members of 
hunting associations in New Zealand. The vast majority of the accidents occur during the day in an 
area with some degree of bush cover and after the hunters have separated. The hunter who 
eventually fires the fatal shot is often expecting to see a deer, sometimes because they have seen a 
deer in the area not long beforehand. They were not expecting to see the victim however. They 
notice movement and see the victim who they perceive as a deer. The average distance is about 35 
metres. Sometimes the shot is taken relatively quickly, but often the hunter studies the target for 
several minutes or longer. The hunter perceives multiple features of a deer. They identify their 
target beyond all doubt—in other words, they have no doubt that what they are looking at is a deer.  
Both the anecdotal reports and Green’s research point to a role of cognitive biases in target 
identification accidents.  
Hunters often experience excitement, which may be anywhere within the range of a subtle increase 
in anticipation right up to a pheŶoŵeŶoŶ kŶoǁŶ as ͞buck fever.͟ Research in numerous fields 
demonstrates that increases in arousal levels (e.g. elevated heart rate and stress) are associated 
with an increased reliance on heuristics. Furthermore, there are optimal levels of arousal and when 
levels surpass this, people experience a drop in decision-making performance.23  
Skill development also coincides with increased use of heuristics and cognitive biases. There are   
clearly varying levels of skill iŶ huŶteƌs. WheŶ ǁe ƌefeƌ to ͞skilled͟ people iŶ ĐoŶteǆts, ǁhat ǁe ofteŶ 
mean is that they have transitioned from slow and consciously-controlled behaviour to more 
automatic behaviour. Development and use of heuristics are integral to this—performance would 
not increase without the help of heuristics.24 
The uncertainties in hunting likely play a role too. As Green & Boyes25 state, ͞HuŶtiŶg as aŶ 
adventure activity contains some inherent uncertainties particularly when sighting an animal in 
terrain where an incomplete view is available because of bush cover or terrain.͟ We know that 
heuristics and cognitive biases occur even more when information is uncertain. Trevor Dyke, former 
President of the New Zealand Deerstalkers Association, appears to allude to this when he says ͞The 
eye sees something and in a flash the brain fills in the missing pieces.͟26 When vision is partially 
                                                             
23 See Hebb, D. O. (1955). Drives and the CNS (conceptual nervous system). Psychological review, 62, 243. 
24 See Green, M. (2006). Human error vs. design error. Trial, 42, 60. 
25 See Green, J., & Boyes, M. (2006). Deer hunting in New Zealand: Safety lessons from the field. New Zealand 
Journal of Outdoor Education Ko Tane Mahuta Pupuke, 2, Issue 1, June. 
26 See Hunting Accidents (Carnachan, 2003) - http://www.investigatemagazine.com/jul03hunt.htm  
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obscured, as it often is when a hunter is searching for game (e.g. by bush or scrub), a person 
(unknowingly) relies, more than usual, on heuristics in order to interpret what they are looking at.27  
8. Specific cognitive biases in mistaken-for-game hunting accidents 
8.1 Availability heuristic 
The availability heuristic refers to our tendency to use or draw upon information that is recent, more 
available, oƌ ͞Đoŵes to ŵiŶd͟ easieƌ.28 This contributes to our efficiency; often more recent 
information is going to be more relevant and useful to us. Also, mentally accessing it is less effortful 
compared to retrieving less recent information. Consider the below image (Figure 2): the hunter who 
has just arrived home after going duck shooting may be more likely to see a duck, whereas the 
opposite is true for the rabbit shooter. Once the viewer perceives one of these animals, it can be 
diffiĐult to ͞uŶ-see͟ that aŶiŵal aŶd see the otheƌ. Additionally, it is not possible to see both at the 
same time. 
 
Figure 2 - Kaninchen und Ente (Duck or rabbit), Fliegende Blatter (1892) 
8.2 Expectancy 
When we expect to hear or see something, our brain prepares or primes us to hear or see that very 
something. This allows us to be quicker at interpreting that information and still able to perceive it 
even when it is doesŶ͛t stand out. The hunter who has seen actual deer feeding in a particular spot 
several times before may expect to see a deer next time they are in the area. This will help them to 
recognise a deer, which is particularly useful if they are difficult to see in that spot. By the same 
token however, they are more likely to mistakenly see a deer, when there is not one there.  
                                                             
27 See Green, M. (2005). Is it a gun or a wallet? Perceptual factors in police shootings of unarmed suspects. Police 
Marksman, July/August, 52–54. 
28 See Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. 
Cognitive psychology, 5, 207–232. 
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Indeed, this can be inferred from prior analyses of mistaken-for-game accidents: often the hunter 
will have heightened expectations of seeing a deer in the area because they either saw one not long 
before the accident, or they, or a hunting companion, shot one in the area on another occasion.29 
8.3 Confirmation bias 
Once we are primed and expecting to see or hear something, without realising it we look for or 
prioritise information or evidence that confirms that thiŶg͛s occurrence. Furthermore, we tend to 
ignore or rationalise away any parts of the occurrence not consistent with our initial expectation-
biased perception of the sighting or sound.30  That is, these dismissal effects add to confirmation bias 
by reducing sensibility to any information that denies the expected occurrence. These effects 
continue to apply for information subsequently obtained. Unfortunately, the unaware victim of 
confirmation bias responds much better to flimsy supporting information. The phenomenon of 
confirmation bias also leads us to favourably process information that we want to be true, and 
dismiss information that we do not want to believe. 
Confirmation bias partly explains how hunters wearing hunter-orange can still be mistaken for game. 
The bright and unnatural colour, that should be ringing alarm bells for a would-be shooter, can 
instead be unconsciously disregarded by them. Another example is the shooting of people carrying 
game. The hunter swears they were looking at a stag with antlers but in reality these were being 
Đaƌƌied upside doǁŶ oŶ the ďaĐk of a huŶteƌ͛s paĐk. The iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that seeŵed to ĐoŶfiƌŵ they 
were looking at a stag (e.g. antlers) was given priority, whereas the disconfirming information (e.g. 
that the antlers were upside down and moving in a non-typical fashion) was unconsciously ignored. 
It is important to understand that the hunter is not making a conscious decision as to which 
information is utilised and which is disregarded; these are unconscious processes.   
8.4 ǲIt won’t happen to meǳ—Optimism bias 
Individuals typically believe that there is less chance of something bad happening to them compared 
to others. This is known as ͞optiŵisŵ ďias.͟ It ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ iŶ sŵokeƌs, for example, who think that 
they are less likely to develop lung cancer than other smokers,31 and drivers who think that they are 
less likely to have an accident than other drivers.32 Note that experts tend to be just as susceptible to 
                                                             
29 See Green, J. (2003). To Hunt and Return: Developing Safe Hunting Practice. Wellington, New Zealand: New 
Zealand Police. 
30  See Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General 
Psychology, 2, 175–220. 
31 See Williams, T., & Clarke, V. A. (1997). Optimistic bias in beliefs about smoking. Australian Journal of 
Psychology, 49, 106–112. 
32 See DeJoy, D. M. (1989). The optimism bias and traffic accident risk perception. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 
21, 333–340. 
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optimism bias as novices, when comparing themselves to people with equal training and 
experience.33  
Foƌ huŶteƌs, theƌe appeaƌs to ďe a ĐoŵŵoŶ ďelief, oƌ ͞fallaĐǇ,͟ that theǇ Đould Ŷeǀeƌ ŵistake a 
person for a deer. This is often reflected in media reports following an accident, where the shooter 
desĐƌiďes haǀiŶg thought ͞it ǁould Ŷeǀeƌ happeŶ to ŵe͟34 and equally (in more fortunate, non-fatal 
circumstances) where someone who was mistaken for game says they never believed that could 
happen to them.35 This is ĐloselǇ ƌelated to the ͞oǀeƌ-faŵiliaƌisatioŶ͟ effeĐt, ǁheƌeďǇ afteƌ people 
are exposed to a hazard again and again their perception of the risks associated with the hazard are 
reduced,36 reflecting a desensitisation of sorts. 
9. The role of experience 
Hunting accidents where people are mistaken for game appear to be more common among 
experienced hunters, which seems counterintuitive. GƌeeŶ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh shoǁed that iŶ oǀeƌ tǁo-thirds 
of the cases, the shooter could be desĐƌiďed as aŶ ͞eǆpeƌieŶĐed huŶteƌ.͟ Whether or not increased 
experience predisposes hunters to being more vulnerable to mistaken identity accidents remains to 
be seen, however it seems plausible when we consider what actually makes an expert an expert.   
Becoming an expert involves the unconscious learning of cues. Experts learn which cues accurately 
predict events or behaviours and which cues are irrelevant. The experienced hunter knows exactly 
what cues sigŶal ͞deeƌ͟ and has long since ceased paying attention to the cues that have not 
successfully resulted in the detection of a deer. When asked about the cues they are using, they will 
be able to verbally express some but not others—the learning of cues is an unconscious process. Try 
for example to explain to somebody how you ride a bike or walk down a set of stairs37—how is it 
that you automatically make those fine adjustments to your balance that at one point in your life 
were so difficult? Experts rely heavily on their abundance of past experiences and their learned cues, 
which help to guide them as to what they can expect and thus make fast and accurate predictions. 
Research shows that experts can be even more susceptible to errors (such as inattentional 
blindness) resulting from cognitive biases than their less-skilled and less-practised counterparts.38 
For the experienced hunter, a risk is that some of the cues that signal the presence of a deer to them 
are the very same cues that a human moving through the bush would display. Equally concerning is 
                                                             
33 See Waylen, A. E., Horswill, M. S., Alexander, J. L., & McKenna, F. P. (2004). Do expert drivers have a reduced 
illusion of superiority?. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 7, 323–331. 
34 See for example http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/8433027/Hunter-who-killed-friend-was-certain-he-was-a-
deer  
35 See for example http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/67712846/hunter-recovers-after-being-shot-in-the-back-
graphic-content  
36 See Outdoor safety risk management for outdoor leaders. Wellington, NZ: NZMSC (Haddock, 2004) p.38–9. 
37 See Green, M. (2006). Human error vs. design error. Trial, 42, 60. 
38 See Green, M. (2004). Inattentional blindness and conspicuity. In Internet Seminar. Link: www.visualexpert. 
com/Resources/inattentionalblindness html.  
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that the cues a hunter has learned to be irrelevant or less-useful over their years of experience may 
include cues which would, crucially, successfully differentiate their hunting companion from a 
deer—it is unsurprising that high hunter experience seems no protector against error. 
10. The cumulative effects of cognitive biases 
Research suggests that the more cognitive biases there are present in a critical situation, the higher 
the likelihood is that the situation will end with unexpected consequences.39 Further, consider not 
only the biases that are involved in the lead-up to the accident, but also the biases that are present 
after the aĐĐideŶt, ǁheŶ the puďliĐ ǁoŶdeƌ ͞hoǁ oŶ eaƌth Đould that happeŶ?͟ Cognitive biases are 
not just involved in the lead-up to and the time of target identification, but they also play a role after 
the event has occurred ;see ͞ǀisual hiŶdsight ďias͟ aŶd ͞fuŶdaŵeŶtal attƌiďutioŶ eƌƌoƌ͟ desĐƌiďed 
earlier), ǁheŶ outside oďseƌǀeƌs atteŵpt to aŶsǁeƌ the ƋuestioŶs of ͞hoǁ͟ aŶd ͞ǁhǇ.͟ 
11. Drift into failure 
The work of Sidney Dekker40 reveals how behaviours can gradually change, over a prolonged period 
of time, in the lead-up to ĐƌitiĐal aĐĐideŶts. ͞Dƌift iŶto failuƌe͟ ŵaǇ help eǆplaiŶ hoǁ a huŶteƌ Đould 
gradually slip into a mode of functioning where he is making visual judgements that could potentially 
be incorrect.  
Through numerous shots in the past, prior to the critical target misidentification accident, a hunter 
;oƌ ƌatheƌ a huŶteƌ͛s brain) fine-tunes their process to maximise efficiency.  
͞Success narrows perceptions, changes attitudes, reinforces a single way of doing business, breeds 
overconfidence in the adequacy of current practices, and reduces the acceptance of opposing points 
of view.͟41 
In the context of target misidentificatioŶ aĐĐideŶts, ͞suĐĐess͟ ĐaŶ ďe thought of as eaĐh tiŵe a taƌget 
was correctly identified, e.g. the target was not a human mistaken for game. For most hunters, this 
will include every shot they have ever taken.  
The drift into failure is slow and changes occur incrementally such that people usually do not notice 
theŵ oĐĐuƌƌiŶg. Bad outĐoŵes ĐaŶ ďe the ƌesult of ǁhat ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed to ďe ͞Ŷoƌŵal͟ fuŶĐtioŶiŶg.   
                                                             
39 See McCammon, I. (2004). Heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents: Evidence and implications. 
Avalanche News, 68, 42–50. 
40 See Dekker, S. (2014). The Field Guide to Understanding 'Human Error'. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.. 
41 From Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2011). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an age of 
uncertainty (Vol. 8). John Wiley & Sons. 
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This may shed more light on how an experienced hunter, who is considered by not just them alone 
but others too to be safe and competent without ever having had an incident, could make a crucial 
eƌƌoƌ of taƌget ideŶtifiĐatioŶ duƌiŶg ͞just aŶotheƌ shot.͟ 
12. Existing research  
Research examining these phenomena specific to hunting is sparse. Predominantly, researchers have 
used databases and statistics on hunting accidents to infer causality and attempt to offer solutions. 
However we found that existing reports on accidents are not well organised or easily accessible.  
We were able to find just two notable pieces of research, both of which attempted to gauge the 
contribution of psychological factors to mistaken-for-game hunting accidents through a series of 
tests. The first details the observations of Maynard Marsh, a woods detective from Maine, USA, who 
analysed 219 hunting accidents where mistaken identity was implicated.42 Marsh realised there was 
a clear trend apparent. The hunters committing these errors were not inexperienced. They were 
well-versed hunters and by all accounts they were considered safe—they were the last sort of 
people that would be expected to fire upon a fellow hunter. Through various psychological tests, 
Marsh found that one type of test stood out as being a differentiator—tests of visual perception. The 
shooters convicted in these woods killings were almost always quicker than average when they had 
to judge ambiguous images that gradually (over a period of minutes) became more discernible. 
Furthermore, these hunters were more likely to believe their reactions were calculated and 
deliberate as opposed to automatic and intuitive. 
͞What ŵakes a good huŶteƌ is ƋuiĐk ǀisual peƌĐeptioŶ. AŶd, uŶlike the gƌeeŶhoƌŶ ǁho 
must think his way through a new situation, the seasoned hunter has developed, 
through years of practice, a fine set of conditioned reflexes. Such gunners think they 
are being deliberate but, gauged by normal standards, they hear, see, and fire with 
deadlǇ speed aŶd aĐĐuƌaĐǇ.͟ – Dietz, 1954. 
The second piece of research was a collaborative study in 1965 between Harvard University 
Scientists and the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Game. Similar tests to those used by 
Marsh were conducted. An article on the research was published in Outdoor Life magazine, with the 
headliŶe ͞A ThiŶg Called EaƌlǇ Bluƌ – The Illusion That Kills.͟ 
 
͞…the ŵajoƌ Đause of the tƌagedies are amazing hallucinations which make it possible 
for any intelligent person, given a combination of normal physical and mental factors, 
to see a deer where no deer exists.͟43  
                                                             
42 See Dietz, L., Woods Detective, Sports Illustrated, November 08, 1954. 
43 From Experiments Disclose Reasons for Accidents: 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19651109&id=dflNAAAAIBAJ&sjid=bosDAAAAIBAJ&pg=
2269,3649853&hl=en  
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While, fifty years on, we may not go as faƌ as usiŶg the teƌŵ ͞halluĐiŶatioŶs͟ iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt, theiƌ 
conclusions are a reflection of the magnitude of the visual perception errors that hunters can make.  
 
13. Research from other industries 
While there is little existing research specific to hunting, there is an abundance of research on how 
cognitive biases contribute to critical accidents in other industries.  
Take the example of a pharmacist who accidentally gave an infant a fatal drug overdose.44 The 
pharmacist͛s pƌeǀious eǆpeƌieŶĐe had pƌiŵaƌilǇ ďeeŶ ǁith adult patieŶts, and she was just covering 
aŶotheƌ phaƌŵaĐist͛s shift. Her error was to misread the drug prescription, adding an extra zero to 
the dosage. This was despite double-checking the advised dosage by consulting a reference book, 
where she made the same error again. The problem was that she expected to see the extra zero on 
the number, because she was so used to reading adult dosages. Without her realising, her brain 
͞filled iŶ͟ this iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, ǁhiĐh ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ useful foƌ heƌ had she ďeeŶ adŵiŶisteƌiŶg aŶ 
adult dosage, which she had done every other time in her life. This demonstrates how expectancy 
and confirmation bias can mislead a person, despite the peƌsoŶ͛s good intentions and the critical 
nature of their work, where they are fully aware that any mistakes can have serious consequences. 
In the military a significant problem involving target identification is friendly fire accidents. 
Expectancy bias has been cited as major factor in some of these accidents.45 Despite the extensive 
training soldiers receive, the rate of friendly fire casualties remains high. If firearms operators who 
receive that level of training are still susceptible to accidental shootings, can we really expect to 
"train these out" of civilians? Indeed, the failure of training and instructions following attempts to 
reduce the effects of biases have been documented.46 Furthermore, experiments have shown that 
police officers can be significantly affected by pre-existing biases when they are approached by a 
possible assailant. For example, depending on their prior expectancies, officers can be more likely to 
͞see͟ a haŶdguŶ ;aŶd by extension, shoot the approaching person) when in fact the person is 
holding a wallet or some other nonthreatening object.47 
The failures of other experts are also well documented. Mountaineers with more experience were 
shown to be just as, if not more, vulnerable to making critical errors in the detection of avalanche 
                                                             
44 See Green, M. (2006). Human error vs. design error. Trial, 42(6), 60. 
45 See Greitzer, F. L., Andrews, D. H., Herz, R. P., & Wolf, M. B. (2010). Training strategies to mitigate expectancy-
induced response bias in combat identification: A research agenda (No. AFRL-RH-AZ-BK-2010-0002). Air Force 
Research Lab. 
46 See Parasuraman, R., & Manzey, D. H. (2010). Complacency and bias in human use of automation: An 
attentional integration. Human Factors, 52, 381–410. 
47 See Green, M. (2005). Is it a gun or a wallet? Perceptual factors in police shootings of unarmed suspects. Police 
Marksman, July/August, 52–54. 
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risks. These eƌƌoƌs ǁeƌe attƌiďuted to the eǆpeƌts ďeiŶg ŵoƌe susĐeptiďle to ͞heuƌistiĐ tƌaps͟ oƌ 
cognitive biases. Similar findings have come from the examination of forensic experts: 
͞Bias and other cognitive influences unconsciously affect hard-working, honest, and dedicated 
foƌeŶsiĐ eǆpeƌts, thus ĐƌeepiŶg iŶ ǁithout the eǆpeƌts’ aǁaƌeŶess. This is a diffiĐult aŶd iŶteƌestiŶg 
pƌoďleŵ, ǁith geŶeƌalizaďilitǇ aĐƌoss doŵaiŶs.͟48 
14. Other contributing factors to target misidentification 
A variety of other contributing factors have been identified and discussed in research.49 These 
factors include:  
14.1 Buck fever  
Buck or stag fever describes a heightened state of arousal in a hunter that can be brought on during 
a hunt. It is associated with increases in adrenaline and excitement, but to levels that are beyond 
what might be considered normal.  Full-scale buck fever does not appear to have been present in 
any of the accidents Green looked at, although some degree of heightened arousal and excitement 
could not be ruled out. As discussed previously, this state would increase the likelihood of cognitive 
biases affecting decision making. 
14.2 Clothing 
A contributing factor is wearing clothing with characteristics that can be confused with game. 
However, while it is advisable to wear high visibility clothing (e.g. Hunter Orange), it should not be 
relied upon. Research out of Virginia revealed that well over half of deer hunters shot in mistaken-
for-game accidents were wearing high visibility clothing to the legal requirement.50 It appears that 
wearing high visibility clothing reduces the chances of being shot, however it by no means 
guarantees immunity. 
14.3 Snap shooting 
Snap shooting describes cases where a shooter sees a target, believes it to be game and fires upon it 
within one movement.49 Avoiding this will undoubtedly reduce the chances of shooting another 
hunter, however it should be noted that many mistaken-for-game accidents involve cases where the 
shooter has carefully studied their target for several minutes or longer.     
15. Careless use of a firearm? 
                                                             
48 From Dƌoƌ, I. E., & Cole, “. A. ;ϮϬϭϬͿ. The ǀisioŶ iŶ ͞ďliŶd͟ justiĐe: Eǆpeƌt peƌĐeptioŶ, judgŵeŶt, aŶd ǀisual 
cognition in forensic pattern recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 161–167. 
49 See Green, J. (2003). To Hunt and Return: Developing Safe Hunting Practice. Wellington, New Zealand: New 
Zealand Police. 
50 See Gulliver, D. (2003). Dangers confronting hunters who fail to wear high vis orange. (pp. Personal 
communication with Joe Green regarding research project).  
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It is reasonable to assume that in the vast majority of mistaken-for-game accidents, the hunter was 
not being deliberately or knowingly careless. They may think that their process is deliberate and 
involves careful reasoning. We know that in fact they are utilising cues that they are often not 
consciously aware of, and operating in somewhat of an automatic manner—again, which they are 
probably not aware of. They are simply doing what has always worked for them, and have no reason 
to believe that this will not work for them the next time, and the time after that. While cognitive 
biases appear to be a cause of many mistaken-for-game accidents, they are not an excuse for these 
accidents. However, vilifying the hunters who make these mistakes, despite following best practices 
͞ďǇ the ďook͟ ŵaǇ ďe a step too faƌ, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁheŶ ǁe ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ diffiĐult it is to ŵaŶage 
cognitive biases. The low number of hunters who even know of the possible role of biases within 
their hunting needs to be considered as well.  
16. Current mitigation practices 
Currently there are several recommendations for mitigating mistaken-for-game accidents. These are 
discussed below in relation to preventing unconscious human error. 
16.1 Identify your target beyond all doubt 
This should be a given for hunters. However despite this being practised, people are still incorrectly 
identifying their targets. This is not to say that they haǀeŶ’t identified their target beyond all doubt—
in their mind they can be 100% certain that they are looking at game. As hunting representatives 
have said or implied iŶ the ŵedia, the ďƌaiŶ ͞fills in the missing pieces.͟ This is indeed what the brain 
uses heuƌistiĐs foƌ, ďut ǁheŶ the ͞ŵissiŶg pieĐes͟ aƌe iŶĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ deteƌŵiŶed, the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes ĐaŶ 
be severe. 
16.2 Treat every sound or movement as human, until proven otherwise 
This piece of advice is frequently advocated in the media by the New Zealand Deer Stalkers 
Association. Unfortunately it is not practical to expect a hunter to consistently do this given the role 
of unconscious processes in their decision making; years of unconscious habits  will prevent this 
from happening. 
16.3 Wear brightly coloured clothing 
As discussed previously, wearing clothing that contrasts with the environment is advised, but it 
should not be relied upon. The phenomenon of confirmation bias can account for how certain visual 
features (such as colour) of a scene can be unknowingly ignored by a hunter who is expecting and/or 
wanting to see game.   
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16.4 Recognise the onset of buck fever and counteract it 
Buck fever is an emotional response. Attempts at suppressing emotional responses can be difficult 
and may even have the opposite effect.51 Furthermore, by the time we are experiencing excitement, 
heuristics and cognitive biases are already in full swing.  
While the above recommendations are all useful in theory, and have no doubt contributed to the 
reduction in hunting accidents over the last fifty years, they will not prevent accidents caused by 
cognitive biases. Hunters should always follow safe hunting practices as well as they can, however 
the biggest problem with this is that heuristics can literally prevent us from being able to adhere to 
these recommendations. Additionally, those practices that we are able to follow ͞ďǇ the ďook,͟ will 
not always prevent mistaken-for-game hunting accidents anyway—e.g. the wearing of high visibility 
clothing. 
17. Professional bodies 
Hunters are repeatedly told they need to change their mind-set and treat every sound or movement 
as human until proven otherwise.  Given the research findings in the white paper, it is considered 
that this will prove ineffective. Simply trying to be more mindful in this sort of environment will not 
work. 
Imagine, an incident occurring in a workplace setting. If no recognised root cause investigation 
embracing the human factor had taken place, and the person involved is simply told to concentrate 
more or ͞change your mind-set,͟ this would be considered completely unacceptable. It would do 
nothing to prevent future incidents, and the workplace safety culture could be considered toxic. It is 
the culture that is the problem, and culture does not change overnight.  
Transposing this back to hunting, it is clear that accidents by some of the most experienced hunters 
are not a case of conscious carelessness. Indeed the very presence of psychological phenomena 
outlined in this report indicates there are many forces that influence all of the senses we come to 
rely upon prior to pulling the trigger. Simply saying ͞concentrate more͟ or be more mindful is not 
the answer.  
It is accepted that some hunter protections (such as high visibility clothing, training and 
communications) are partly effective—but then again so are hard hats and steel capped shoes. 
However accidents still happen—the current protections only work up until a point. At the moment 
the level of protection is insufficient and, too often, the heuristic-prone hunter becomes the last line 
of defence against aŶ aĐĐideŶt ǁheŶ thiŶgs doŶ͛t go aĐĐoƌdiŶg to plaŶ. 
 
                                                             
51 See Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of thought 
suppression. Journal of personality and social psychology, 53, 5. 
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18. An objective warning for risk mitigation 
If the role of cognitive biases is indeed as significant as we believe, mitigating mistaken-for-game 
accidents is a formidable challenge. Given the difficulty of preventing cognitive biases from 
occurring—which is perhaps a futile cause—an additional approach to prevent mistaken identity 
accidents is required. Technology could provide a useful addition to the existing methods. 
For example, the military has a significant problem with friendly fire arising from target 
misidentification, and is seeking a technological, objectively-impartial warning system. One 
technology that shows promise for mitigating friendly fire is the Blue Force Tracking system, which 
uses GPS information to show soldiers the location of allies.52 Other technologies include Identity-
Friend-Foe systems, which commonly use radar and/or infrared systems to classify targets as foes or 
friends to the user of the system.53 
19. The need for research 
There is currently a notable lack of research into hunting accidents. While it is possible to take well-
established and accepted knowledge of psychological phenomena and apply this to hunting, as has 
been done here, validation of the ideas here and definitive conclusions can only be reached after 
actual research and experimentation is conducted. It is important that any such research carried out 
is done with hunters, of a range of experiences, in a context that is not completely removed from 
the ͞ƌeal thiŶg.͟  
Simulations could offer one practical approach for hunting research. Military researchers often use 
these to create environments that are relatively high-fidelitǇ oƌ ͞life-like.͟54 Equipment such as laser 
guns have been successfully used to replicate firearms in laboratory-based simulations where 
shooters are required to make shoot/no-shoot decisions.55 Through controlled experimentation, it 
would be possible to gain a better understanding of the impact of cognitive biases on the shoot/no-
shoot decisions that hunters face. We anticipate that the most effective research will be possible 
when there is collaboration between relevant organisations that jointly have industry and human 
factors expertise. 
20. Conclusion 
                                                             
52 See Bryant, D. J., & Smith, D. G. (2013). Impact of blue force tracking on combat identification judgments. 
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 55, 75-89. 
53 See Seah, C., & Deepan, M. (2012). Identification Friend or Foe: A Necessity On The Battlefield. Journal of the 
Singapore Armed Forces, 38, 59–66. 
54 See Patton, D. J. (2014). How Real Is Good Enough? Assessing Realism of Presence in Simulations and Its Effects 
on Decision Making. In Foundations of Augmented Cognition. Advancing Human Performance and Decision-
Making through Adaptive Systems (pp. 245–256). Springer International Publishing. 
55 See Wilson, K., Head, J., & Helton, W.S. (2013). Friendly fire in a simulated firearms task. Proceedings of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 57, 1244–1248. 
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Heuristics and cognitive biases are useful the vast majority of the time and they generally assist us 
greatly in our day-to-day lives. However, they can significantly contribute to serious human error. 
Target misidentification in hunting is one example of this. It is highly likely that cognitive biases—
particularly availability heuristic, expectancy, confirmation bias, and optimism bias—play a 
prominent role in mistaken-for-game accidents. In many of these accidents, had the shooters not 
experienced these biases, the shots would probably never have been fired. 
Without an understanding of the relevant psychological phenomena and the likelihood of their 
impacts upon these accidents, it is unwise to pass judgement on those involved. The idea that 
hunters just need to ͞change their mind-set͟ in order to prevent these accidents occurring is 
unrealistic. Trying to prevent cognitive biases can be near impossible, given the difficulty we have in 
detecting them and the fact that we consistently underestimate the impact they have upon us.   
Current recommended safety practices, whilst effective to a degree, are simply not good enough to 
avoid the critical errors that are caused by these unconscious processes. Research specific to hunting 
needs to be conducted in order to better understand the involvement of cognitive biases in failures 
of target identification. Given that humans are not properly equipped to recognise the presence of 
cognitive biases, or to moderate their effects, we need to devise alternative strategies to deal with 
them. This may require introducing the impartiality of technology to mitigate the risks associated 
with cognitive biases in hunting. 
A man makes his way through the bush, sometime after splitting up with his hunting 
companion. A movement nearby captures his attention. He stops and sees what 
appears to be a deer, less than 40 metres away. This is what he has been waiting 
for. He carefully moves to a better position and again eyes his target. He can make 
out the head and the antlers of the deer and watches as it feeds; its head bobs up 
and down. It is definitely, 100% a deer and he prepares to shoot. What is there to 
stop him? 
 
